{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Trainy","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog","author_name":"Ben","author_url":"https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog\/author\/ben\/","title":"Toys \u201cR\u201d Us : comment un LBO mal structur\u00e9 peut contribuer \u00e0 la chute d\u2019une entreprise - Trainy","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"aleaJtRpfG\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog\/fr\/toysrus-lbo\/\">Toys \u201cR\u201d Us : comment un LBO mal structur\u00e9 peut contribuer \u00e0 la chute d\u2019une entreprise<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog\/fr\/toysrus-lbo\/embed\/#?secret=aleaJtRpfG\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"\u00ab\u00a0Toys \u201cR\u201d Us : comment un LBO mal structur\u00e9 peut contribuer \u00e0 la chute d\u2019une entreprise\u00a0\u00bb &#8212; Trainy\" data-secret=\"aleaJtRpfG\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.trainy.co\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/5\/Cover-300.jpg","thumbnail_width":1920,"thumbnail_height":1080,"description":"Dans l'univers du private equity, peu de transactions sont aussi souvent cit\u00e9es que celle de Toys R Us. Pendant de nombreuses ann\u00e9es, ce dossier a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme l'exemple parfait des risques associ\u00e9s \u00e0 un levier excessif et \u00e0 une mauvaise adaptation aux \u00e9volutions du march\u00e9. Si la faillite de Toys \u201cR\u201d Us ne peut pas \u00eatre attribu\u00e9e uniquement \u00e0 son LBO, cette op\u00e9ration illustre parfaitement comment une structure de financement inadapt\u00e9e peut"}